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The concept of collective acceptance has been studied in the philosophical
domain in opposition to group attitudes such as common belief (and common
knowledge), that are popular in artificial intelligence and theoretical computer
science [2, 6]. The main difference between these two concepts is that the
collective acceptance by a set of agents C is based on the identification of the
agents in C as members of the same group (or team, organization, institution,
etc.) and on the fact that the agents in C recognize each other as members of
the same group. Common belief (and common knowledge) does not necessarily
entail this aspect of mutual recognition and identification with respect to a
social context. In this sense, according to [5, 7], collective acceptance rather
than common belief is more appropriate to characterize a proper notion of group
belief.
Our starting point is the logic of acceptance proposed in [3]. It has modal
operators AC :x , where C is a set of agents and x is a social context. The
formula AC :xϕ reads ‘agents in C accept that ϕ while functioning together as
members of x ’. Contrarily to standard epistemic and doxastic logic a set of
agents’ acceptances is not necessarily consistent (even in the same context).
The formula AC :x⊥ simply means that the agents in C are not functioning
together as members of x : they do not identify themselves with group x , they
are not part of the organization x , etc. The logic of acceptance has a standard
possible worlds semantics with an accessibility relation AC :x associated to each
group-context pair 〈C , x 〉.1
Here we present an extension of the logic of acceptance by two kinds of
dynamic operators. The first are announcements of the form x !ψ, meaning that
ψ is announced in the context x : the members of x learn that ψ is true in
that context, while the other agents do not learn anything. In terms of Kripke
models, all agents eliminate x -arrows to those worlds where ¬ψ holds from
their possibilities. These announcements are similar to private announcements
of dynamic epistemic logic [1, 4].
In our logic the formula Ai:xp → [x !¬p]Ai:x⊥ is valid: if i accepts p in
context x , and subsequently learns that ¬p is the case in that context, then
the agent is no longer part of the social context x . Agents can revise their
acceptances in order to (re)enter a social context. To model this we consider
1The accessibility relations have to satisfy constraints of positive and negative intro-
spection, as well as an inclusion principle: when B ⊆ C then either AC :x (w) = ∅, or
AB:x (w) ⊆ AC :x (w), for every possible world w . They also have to satisfy a principle of
unanimity: if w ′ ∈ AC :x (w) then w ′ ∈ Ai:x (w ′) for some i ∈ C .
1
announcements of the form i←C :x , meaning that agent i adopts C ’s accep-
tances in context x . In terms of Kripke models, the accessibility relation Ai:x
is identified with AC :x .
The resulting logic has a complete axiomatization in terms of reduction
axioms for both dynamic operators. Those for x !ψ are similar to reduction
axioms of dynamic epistemic logic. Those for i←C :x are as follows:
[i←C :x ]AB :yϕ↔ AC :x [i←C :x ]ϕ if x = y , i ∈ B and B ⊆ C
[i←C :x ]AB :yϕ↔ > if x = y , i ∈ B and B 6⊆ C
[i←C :x ]AB :yϕ↔ AB :y [i←C :x ]ϕ else
Other kinds of retraction operations can be devised, and will be discussed
in the presentation. For example, we will consider the operation of creating a
supergroup D of a given group C, where D takes over all of C’s acceptances.
The logical form of such an operation is [D:=C :x ]ϕ. This allows in particular
to express that the agents in D start to function as members of x , i.e. to move
from AD:x⊥ to ¬AD:x⊥.
Note that our logic differs from dynamic epistemic logic, where no reduction
axiom for announcements followed by the common belief operator exist. Intu-
itively, it means that C ’s common belief may appear ‘out of the blue’: it was
not foreseeable by C that common belief would ‘pop up’. Reduction axioms for
group acceptances can be justified by its constitutive aspects of mutual recog-
nition and identification with respect to a social context. Therefore, our logic
of acceptance and announcements provides a simple, elegant and effective way
of integrating a revision mechanism into the logic of acceptance. This contrasts
with other approaches where a lot of machinery had to be added to dynamic
epistemic logics in order to integrate a revision mechanism [8].
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